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Will the internet become a “worldwide censorship machine”? Has the “risk that a
single EU court within a single EU member state would become the censor for the
world” been realized? Not quite. Much of the critique of the recent Austrian Supreme
Court ruling Glawischnig-Piesczek/Facebook Ireland Limited (OGH 15.09.2020, 6 Ob
195/19y) is based on a wrong reading of the law and policy behind the judgment.
Factual and Legal Background
The proceedings have been going on for a while: In 2016, a Facebook user
published an article on the platform which included a picture of Eva Glawischnig-
Piesczek, the former leader of the Austrian Green Party. The Facebook user
commented on the article with an offensive statement, referring to Glawischnig-
Piesczek as a “lousy traitor” (“miese Volksverräterin”), “corrupt oaf” (“korrupter
Trampel”) and a member of a “fascist party” (“Faschistenpartei”).
Since Facebook refused to remove this comment, Glawischnig-Piesczek filed for an
injunction due to violation of §78 öUrhG (i.e. the Copyright Act, because a picture
of her was included) and § 1330 öABGB (para. 1: “If someone has been caused
real harm or loss of profit by insulting [their] honor, [they are] entitled to demand
compensation”). Glawischnig-Piesczek alleged false statements of fact (“corrupt”,
“fascist party”), made in a way and under circumstances that would cause the
average reasonable Austrian to take them seriously.
What some commentators, especially with a US background, do not appreciate is
that German words like “Faschist” have narrower semantic fields than their English
counterparts. Accusing Glawischnig’s party, the Greens, of fascism, the Vienna
Commercial court held, was a  factual statement.
At the Commercial Court
In opposition to Glawischnig’s motion, Facebook argued that the company was
a hosting provider within the meaning of § 16 ECG – the E-Commerce Act which
transposes the EU E-Commerce Directive (ECD) into Austrian law – and therefore
subject to the immunities provided therein. The company, Facebook argued, should
not be a party to this lawsuit in the first place. The court disagreed. Facebook was
accused of not having removed the post after the problem had been specifically
pointed out to it in a letter from Glawischnig-Piesczek’s lawyers. In December 2016,
the trial court ordered Facebook to delete the post at issue and any recognizable
future reposts. Specifically, Facebook was ordered to delete any and all posts that
(1) include a picture of Glawischnig and (2) accuse Glawischnig of being corrupt, a
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Fascist, a “Volksverräterin,” or any combination thereof  (HG Wien 07.12.2016, 11
CG 65/16 w 17, p 1).
The order did not specify any particular geographic scope. This means that the
injunction was meant to apply in all of Austria but nowhere else. Firstly, countries do
not, as a general rule, claim remit to provide injunctive relief beyond their borders.
An Austrian injunction that enjoins foreigners from causing harm on foreign soil
is a departure from standard practice that at the very least needs to be made
explicit. Secondly, it is settled case-law that an Austrian court cannot extend the
geographical application of a judgment unless the plaintiff expressly asks it to do so
(OGH 30.03.2020, 4 Ob 36/20b, pp 3-4). Glawischnig-Piesczek did not request any
scope other than Austrian as a matter of record.
The trial court did not feel the need to limit the order to Austria because the order
being limited to Austria was the obvious, intuitive default.
The first appeal
Facebook appealed the injunction. § 16 ECG requires hosting providers to remove
material they know infringes the law, but case-law has made it clear that this
obligation only exists if the infringement is obvious to the legal layperson  (OLG
05.05.2017, 5 R 5/17t, pp 5, 14). This was not the case here, Facebook claimed
(p 7). Infringements of the Copyright Act are a special case as a matter of statute,
the appellate bench replied: according to § 81 (1a) UrhG, a provider cannot plead
ignorance of the law in Copyright Act cases if it has been served with a formal
warning (pp 14-17).
In case the order was not going to be lifted, Facebook requested that it be narrowed.
Firstly, Facebook pointed out that the injunction enjoined the company to remove
not just the original post and any verbatim reposts but also any other new posts that
paraphrased or otherwise restated the original. The company could set up filters to
catch exact reposts but could not be expected to catch any and all new comments
that were just vaguely comparable. The court concurred  (pp 1-2, 17-21).
Secondly, the injunction should be limited to comments submitted from within
Austria. This the court declined (p 21). This important exchange is difficult to parse
without access to the lawyers’ internal notes, but it appears as though Facebook and
the court were talking at cross purposes here. What Facebook should have asked
for, and probably meant to ask for, is narrowing the injunction to posts accessible
from (and not submitted from within) Austria. Austria’s claim to jurisdiction and
Austria’s choice to apply Austrian law are both based on the fact that Austria is a
country in which the material alleged to be defamatory is available to be read, and
therefore the place of impact. Facebook is not liable in Austria for content that does
not ‘exist’  (i.e. can be seen) in Austria.
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The second appeal
Both parties appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (OGH). Glawischnig-
Piesczek asked for the injunction to be restored to its original state: Facebook should
be required to delete not just any new comments reproducing the original comment
exactly but also any new comments merely paraphrasing it. Facebook conceded that
the trial court was correct to order the removal of the original comment but reiterated
that the company should not be enjoined to engage in any proactive monitoring of
future comments.
It is worth noting that Facebook no longer alleged the injunction was of “global
scope”, either in its original or in its amended form. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that Facebook had in fact barred the original comment from being
accessed in Austria, apparently through some form of geoblocking. The Supreme
Court tacitly accepted the geoblocking as compliance, thus confirming once again
that no takedown “on a global scale” had been demanded at any stage (OGH
25.10.2017, 6 Ob 116/17b, pp 3-4).
A can of worms for Luxemburg
The Supreme Court held that an injunction covering material of “equivalent meaning”
is permissible and in fact desirable under settled case law (pp 11-12). The bench felt
uncertain, however, whether such an injunction was compatible with the prohibition
on general monitoring in Art. 15 (1) ECD and asked the CJEU for a preliminary
ruling.
National courts have wide discretion to aim for broad decisions (CJEU 16.12.1981,
C-244/80). However, the Supreme Court chose to make very liberal use of this
discretion and test essentially every conceivable kind of injunction, including a
hypothetical injunction applying “worldwide”. It is not obvious why the Supreme
Court opened this particular can of worms as global application had, as we have
discussed, not been at issue previously.
In 2019, the CJEU stated that worldwide take-down orders do not contradict the
ECD (CJEU 03.10.2019, C 18/18; see here on the CJEU’s reasoning). However,
the CJEU mentioned that national courts have to make sure that the worldwide
injunction does not interfere with international law.
Overlooked: The OGH decision in ORF/Facebook
The Austrian Supreme Court relied on the CJEU’s ruling for the first time in its
ORF/Facebook judgment earlier this year (ORF/Facebook Ireland Limited, OGH
30.03.2020, 4 Ob 36/20b). Therein, it interpreted the CJEU judgment to mean that
national courts had to take into account internationally recognized legal principles
when deciding about the worldwide effect of removal orders (paras 5.2 and 5.5).
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These considerations of the Austrian Supreme Court are a good representation
of the CJEU’s reasoning. What is surprising is that the Supreme Court read the
CJEU judgment to mean that the ECD, while leaving the ultimate decision to national
courts, generally intended removal orders to have a worldwide effect (paras 5.2 and
5.5). There is no clear evidence for this claim in the CJEU judgment.
As the specific case at issue regarded copyright infringement, the Austrian Supreme
Court concluded that the principle of territoriality was applicable: “[T]he copyright
claim, like other intellectual property rights claims, is not global in scope, but is
limited territorially. However, this does not apply to the protection of personal rights.
Such rights are in general not territorially limited […].” (para 5.3).
Overinterpreted: The OGH decision in Glawischnig-
Piesczek/Facebook
The Austrian Supreme Court’s judgment in Glawischnig-Piesczek/Facebook differs
from the ORF/Facebook case as it is not about copyright infringement, but about
Glawischnig-Piesczek’s personality right not to be defamed through untrue and
offensive online content. According to the Supreme Court’s obiter dictum in ORF/
Facebook, personality rights generally do not have territorial limitations.
The Supreme Court, however, decided to take the “easy way out” in this case: only
two sentences of the 15-page ruling deal with the question of worldwide applicability:
“The appellate court rejected [Facebook’s] plea in the appeal to restrict
the injunction to Austria, which – under consideration of certain conditions
– can also quite meet the position of the ECJ in its judgement C-18/18.
Whether that is actually the case in this proceeding can […] remain open
because the defendant [Facebook] in the revision appeal proceedings did
not refer to the question again.”
Thus, the Supreme Court touches on the topic of worldwide applicability of
personality rights very cautiously, seemingly trying to avoid setting a(nother)
precedent. Specifically, the Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the court of
first impression which, let us recall, did not specify any particular geographic scope.
The reinstated injunction was meant to apply in all of Austria but nowhere else. The
Supreme Court stated that (in theory) it might well be compatible with the CJEU’s
Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment to give worldwide effect to the injunction. However,
it was not necessary to consider this matter since Facebook had not brought it up
before the Supreme Court.
No global censorship
The decision on the injunction therefore does not lead the way to “worldwide
censorship”. It does not even serve as a good precedent for the worldwide
applicability of removal orders in defamation cases. As this is only a decision on the
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injunction, the question is likely to be discussed again in the main proceedings of the
case.
In addition, as two Austrian commentators, Michael Otti and Nikolas Raunigg,
remind us, the decision will in any case not be too “useful for despots”. After all, the
actual power of judgments lies in the recognition and enforcement of the decision.
Within the EU, as Otti and Raunigg note, such a framework exists. In Ireland, where
Facebook’s European subsidiary is headquartered, the Austrian Supreme Court’s
decision can be enforced. But the decisions of courts from authoritarian states
cannot be enforced quite so easily. National courts could after all refuse to enforce
injunctions by reference to violations of ordre public.
While it is understandable that human rights campaigners use this judgment as a
wake-up call in the important fight for human rights protection online, it is unfortunate
that the narrative of national courts imposing takedown duties on platforms without
respect of borders is amplified uncritically. We need the necessary nuance and –
ideally – some knowledge of the local substantive and procedural law. After all, let’s
not have “the despots” get ideas.
- 5 -
